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Valerie West
ABSTRACT
The contributions of order-maintenance policing and broken windows theory to
New York City’s remarkable crime decline have been the subject of contentious
debate. The dominant policing tactic in New York since the 1990s has been
aggressive interdiction of citizens through street encounters in the search for
weapons or drugs. Research showed that minority citizens in the 1990s were
disproportionately stopped, frisked and searched at rates significantly higher than
would be predicted by their race-specific crime rates, and that this excess
enforcement was explained by the social structure of predominantly minority
neighborhoods than by either their disorder or their crime rates. In the decade
since the first study on OMP, stop rates have increased by 500 percent while
crime rates have remained low and stable. In this article, we update and extend
research on order maintenance policing in New York City to explain temporal
and spatial patterns of police stops of citizens from 1999 to 2006. We estimate
stop rates by neighborhood as a function of local crime rates, neighborhood
demography and social structure, and physical disorder, including direct
measures of broken windows. We report that the sharp increase in stop activity
since 1999 is concentrated in predominantly poor and minority neighborhoods,
and that these stops continue to be more closely tied to demographic and
socioeconomic conditions than to disorder or crime. Moreover, we show that the
efficiency of stops in producing arrests has declined over a decade as stops have
increased, and that the decline is greatest in predominantly minority
neighborhoods where stop activity is highest. We then compare the probabilities
of police stops for young adults by race and ethnicity, to show the extraordinary
concentration of stops of minorities. Absent reliable evidence that these tactics
are either efficient or effective crime reduction measures, we attribute the excess
stops to institutional management concerns, such as productivity and supervision
or intelligence gathering, at the expense of the City’s minority citizens. The
racial-spatial concentration of excess stop activity threatens to undermine police
legitimacy and diminish the social good of policing, while doing little to reduce
crime or disorder.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The role of policing in New York City’s crime decline has been the subject of
contentious debate for well over a decade. Violent crime reached its modern peak in New
York City in 1991, followed by a 10 percent decline in 1992-93 (Fagan, Zimring and Kim,
1998). This initial crime decline was spurred by the hiring and quick deployment in 1991
of 5,000 additional officers under the Safe Streets Program (McCall, 1997; Greene, 1999;
Waldeck, 2000; Karmen, 2000). During this initial decline, police tactics remained largely
unchanged from the preceding years. Following the mayoral election in 1993, newly
appointed Police Commissioner William Bratton implemented a regime of “ordermaintenance policing” (OMP), which – together with other management reforms and
innovations – dramatically and suddenly changed both the strategy and tactics of policing
across the City. The new strategy was grounded in Broken Windows theory (Wilson and
Kelling, 1982; Kelling and Coles, 1996) and focused on the connection between physical
and social disorder and violence (Greene, 1999; Livingston, 1997; Spitzer, 1999; Sampson
and Raudenbush, 1999; Dunier, 1999; Waldeck, 2000; Fagan and Davies, 2000; Taylor,
2001; Harcourt, 2001).
In the new policing model, police tactics, resources and attention were redirected
toward removal of visible signs of social disorder – “broken windows” – by using police
resources both for vigorous enforcement of laws on minor “quality of life” offenses, while
aggressively interdicting citizens in an intensive and widespread search for weapons
(Kelling and Coles, 1996; Bratton and Knobler, 1998; Silverman, 1999). Tactically,
policing in this era had several faces, from frequent arrests for low-level crimes such as
public drinking, graffiti and, more recently, marijuana possession (Golub et al., 2007;
Harcourt and Ludwig, 2007; Levine and Small, 2008), to aggressive street-level
interdictions and searches of citizens whose behaviors signaled their potential for any of
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several types of crime, but most notably carrying weapons (Harcourt, 1998; Fagan and
Davies, 2000; Gelman, Fagan and Kiss, 2007). Using aggressive “stop and frisk” tactics,
this brand of order-maintenance policing (OMP) was designed to reduce violence and
weapons possession (Spitzer, 1999; Waldeck, 2000; Fagan and Davies, 2000; Harcourt,
2001).
The origins of the tactical shift are revealed in strategy documents issued by the
New York City Police Department (NYPD) in 1994. First, Police Strategy No. 5,
Reclaiming the Public Spaces of New York articulated a reconstructed version of “broken
windows” theory (Wilson and Kelling, 1982) as the driving force in the development of
policing policy. It stated that the NYPD would apply its enforcement efforts to “reclaim
the streets” by systematically and aggressively enforcing laws against low-level social
disorder: graffiti, aggressive panhandling, fare beating, public drunkenness, unlicensed
vending, public drinking, public urination, and other low-level misdemeanor offenses.
Second, Police Strategy No. 1, Getting Guns Off the Streets of New York, formalized the
strategic focus on the eradication of gun violence through the tactical measure of
intensifying efforts to seize illegal firearms. Homicide trends in New York City since
1985 provided strong empirical support for emphasizing gun violence in enforcement
policy (Davis and Matea-Gelabert, 1999). Nearly all the increases in homicides, robberies,
and assaults from 1985-91 were attributable to gun violence (Fagan et al., 1998). The
homicide crisis was a critical theme in the mayoral election campaign of 1993, and focused
the attention of the incoming Giuliani administration’s crime-control policy on gun
violence (Silverman, 1999).
By the end of the decade, stops and frisks of persons suspected of crimes had
become a flashpoint for grievances by the City’s minority communities, who came under
the closest surveillance of the police and who were most often stopped and frisked
(Spitzer, 1999; Kocieniewski, 1999; Roane, 1999; Jackson, 2000). In a 15 month period
from January 1998 through March 1999, Non-Hispanic Black, Hispanic Black, and
Hispanic White New Yorkers were three times more likely than their white counterparts to
be stopped and frisked on suspicion of weapons or violent crimes relative to each group’s
participation in each of those two types of crimes (Gelman, Fagan and Kiss, 2007). These
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excess stops – stops beyond the rate that one would predict from the race-specific crime
rates – could be explained neither by the crime rates in those areas in the City’s poorest
areas, nor by signs and manifestations of social disorder, nor by the presence of physical
disorder in the form of actual “broken windows” or building or neighborhood decay.
Instead, Fagan and Davies (2000) reported that policing was disproportionately
concentrated in the City’s poorest neighborhoods with the highest concentrations of
minority citizens, even after controlling for rates of crime and physical disorder in those
places (see, also, Gelman et al., 2007).
Despite its racial disproportionality, the harsh spotlight of a federal court order
enjoining the NYPD from racially selective enforcement (Daniels et al. v. City of New
York, 2003), and arrest rates of less than 15 percent resulting from stops (Spitzer 1999;
Gelman et al., 2007), the OMP policy continued far into the next decade (Baker, 2009), a
long after Spitzer (1999) first reported on racial disparities in street stops. Yet New York
City had changed dramatically during this period, even after rates of crime and disorder
had fallen. Housing prices had soared for more than a decade in all neighborhoods,
including those that had the highest violence rates in the preceding decade (Fagan and
Davies, 2007), and new housing replaced abandoned lots and decaying buildings across the
City (Schwartz, 1999). Welfare rolls thinned, the number of immigrants landing in the
City’s poorest neighborhoods rose sharply while populations of African Americans
declined by more than 10 percent (Beveridge, forthcoming). With minor and random ticks
up and down, crime remained nearly flat and low since 2000 (Levine and Small, 2008).
Yet, in a safe and thriving city, the number of citizen stops grew by 500% between
2003 and 2007 (Baker 2008, 2009; Ridgeway et al., 2008), long after crime had
precipitously declined to and remained at historic lows. The efficiency of these stops –
that is, the rate at which crime was detected leading to an arrest – declined from about 15%
in 1998-9 (Gelman et al., 2007) to 7.8 percent in 2003 to less than 4.1 percent in 2006
(Table 1 infra). As we show in this article, street stops continue to be disproportionately
concentrated in the City’s poorest areas, not unlike a decade earlier. The logic of a sharp
rise in street stops and a corresponding sharp decline in their efficiency, in an era of flat
crime rates, demands analysis and explanation.
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In this article, we examine the exponential rise in street stops in an era of stable
crime rates and look to the community contexts of these stops to identify the predictors of
stops. The everyday routines of New Yorkers of different ethnic and racial groups take
place in vastly different local contexts, and it is in these contexts that the heterogeneity and
disparate impact of policing practices are most observable. Accordingly, we identify local
area characteristics of crime, disorder and social structure that predict race-specific police
stop activity. We extend the work of Fagan and Davies (2000) from 1999 to two time
periods in the current decade, across an extended era of declining and then stably low
crime rates. We find that the dramatic increase in stop activity in recent years is
concentrated predominantly in minority neighborhoods, and that minority residents are
likely to be disproportionately subjected to law enforcement contact based on the
neighborhoods in which they live rather than the crime problems in those areas. Moreover,
this disproportionate contact is based on more than the level of neighborhood crime and
disorder; demographic makeup predicts stop activity above and beyond what local crime
conditions suggest is necessary and justifiable.
We also test the efficiency of street stops to detect wrongdoing and sanction
offenders, and find it to be low and declining over time: as stops have become more
prevalent in recent years they are substantially less likely to lead to arrests. These
limitations are particularly pronounced in neighborhoods with high Black populations,
suggesting that Black citizens are not only at an elevated risk of police contact compared to
non-Hispanic Whites and Hispanics, but that the standards used to justify stops in their
neighborhoods may be lower than those in neighborhoods with higher White populations.
Finally, we examine and compare specific age-race-cohort impacts of policing to illustrate
the extraordinary concentration of policing along racial and ethnic lines.
Our analysis begins with a brief history of the constitutional and theoretical
frameworks for New York’s OMP strategy, with attention to the racial dimensions of
modern policing. We then discuss the data, models, and results, followed by discussion
and conclusions.
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II. BACKGROUND
A. Race, Neighborhoods, and Police Stops
Nearly a century of legal and social trends set the stage for the current debate on
race and policing. Historically, close surveillance by police has been a part of everyday
life for African Americans and other minority groups (see, for example, Musto, 1973;
Kennedy, 1997; Cole, 1998; Loury, 2002; Weitzer and Tuch, 2006). In recent decades, the
U.S. Supreme Court has sanctioned border interdictions of persons of Mexican or Hispanic
ethnicity to halt illegal immigration (U.S. v. Martinez-Fuerte, 1976), as well as the racial
components of drug courier profiling by airlines (U.S. v. Harvey, 1994). In U.S. v. Whren
(1996), the Supreme Court allowed the use of race as a basis for a police stop as long as
there were other factors that motivated the stop, and in Brown v. Oneonta (2002), a federal
district court permitted the use of race as a search criterion if there was an explicit racial
description of the suspect.
The legal standard to regulate the constitutionality of police conduct in citizen stops
derives from Terry v. Ohio (1968), which involved a pedestrian stop that established the
parameters of the “reasonable suspicion” standard for police conduct in detaining citizens
for purposes of search or arrest. Recently, the courts have expanded the concept of`
“reasonable suspicion” to include location as well as the individual's behavior. In fact, the
Court has articulated and refined this “high crime area” doctrine, in cases from Adams v
Williams (1972) to Illinois v. Wardlow (2000). This line of cases allows police to consider
the character of a neighborhood as a factor justifying a standard lower than the
constitutionally-defined threshold in individualized “reasonable” suspicion articulated in
Terry v Ohio (1968) (Ferguson and Bernache, 2008). For example, in Wardlow, the
Supreme Court noted that although an individual’s presence in a “high crime area” does
not meet the standard for a particularized suspicion of criminal activity, a location's
characteristics are relevant to determining whether a behavior is sufficiently suspicious to
warrant further investigation. Since “high crime areas” and social disadvantage often are
conflated both perceptually and statistically with concentrations of minority citizens
(Massey and Denton, 1993; Sampson and Lauritsen, 1994; Thompson, 1999; Loury, 2002;
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Fagan, 2008; Sampson and Raudenbush, 1999, 2004; Alpert, MacDonald and Dunham,
2005; Ferguson and Bernache, 2008; Massey, 2007), this logic places minority
neighborhoods at risk for elevating the suspiciousness of their residents in the eyes of the
police.
But in connecting race and policing, the Court was only formalizing what
criminologists had known for decades. Early studies on police selection of citizens for
stops suggested that both the racial characteristics of the suspect and the racial composition
of the suspect's neighborhood influence police decisions to stop, search, or arrest a suspect
(Reiss, 1971, Bittner, 1976). Particularly in urban areas, suspect race interacts with
neighborhood characteristics to animate the formation of suspicion among police officers
(Smith, 1986; Thompson, 1999, Smith et al., 2006). For example, Alpert et al. (2005)
showed that police are more likely to view a minority citizen as suspicious–leading to a
police stop–based on non-behavioral cues while relying on behavioral cues to develop
suspicion for white citizens.
Individuals – including police and political leaders – also may substitute racial
characteristics of communities for racial characteristics of individuals in their cognitive
schema of suspicion, and, more important, act on them. Quillan and Pager (2001) find that
urban residents’ perceptions of crime in their neighborhoods are significantly predicted by
the prevalence of young black men, even after crime levels and other neighborhood
characteristics are controlled for. Police perceptions may be similarly skewed, resulting in
elevated stop rates in neighborhoods with high concentrations of minority populations, and
the pathway is through the translation of perceptions into neighborhood stigma. For
example, in a study of police practices in three cities, Smith (1986) showed that suspects in
poor neighborhoods were more likely to be arrested, after controlling for suspect behavior
and the type of crime. Suspects' race and racial composition of the suspect's neighborhood
were also significant predictors of police response. It seems that social psychological
mechanisms interact with cultural processes (patterns of behavior) and structural features
of neighborhoods (poverty, concentrations of minority citizens) to produce perceptions of
disorder that perpetuate urban inequality (Sampson and Raudenbush, 2004) through
several forms of discrimination, including policing intensity and tactics (Fagan and Davies,
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2000). Recall that Fagan and Davies showed that street stops in New York were predicted
not by disorder but by race and poverty, despite policing theories that emphasized disorder
as a pathway to elevated crime. Poor neighborhoods are stigmatized in this way, and
people both within these areas as well as those who reside elsewhere – including those
with administrative authority to withhold or allocate various services – are likely to act on
their perceptions.
Alternatively, these coercive police responses may relate to the perception that poor
neighborhoods may have limited capacity for social control and self-regulation. This
strategy was formalized in the influential “broken windows” essay of Wilson and Kelling
(1982). They argued that police responses to disorder were critical to communicate
intolerance for crime and to halt its contagious spread. Broken windows called for the
targeting of police resources to neighborhoods where public order was deteriorating, with
the expectation that stopping disorderly behavior would stem the “developmental
sequence” to more serious crime. In the original essay, Wilson and Kelling worried about
“criminal invasion” of disorderly neighborhoods. Neighborhood disorder has explicitly
been used as a criterion for allocating police resources in New York City since 1994, when
Commissioner William Bratton set policies to focus on minor offenses such as subway fare
evasion and aggressive panhandling, in addition to felonies and other serious crime
(Kelling and Cole 1996). The policy also called for aggressive responses to social disorder
that was endogenous to neighborhoods, in contrast to the “criminal invasion” concern in
the theory’s pristine form.
This order-maintenance approach also has been disputed, however, as critics
question the causal link between disorder and more serious crime (compare Harcourt,
1998, 2001, Harcourt and Ludwig, 2006, Sampson and Raudenbush, 1999, 2004, and
Taylor, 2001, with Skogan, 1990; Mocan and Corman, 2000; Rosenfeld, Fornango, and
Rengifo, 2007). Despite the potential endogeneity of race and both social and physical
disorder (Fagan and Davies, 2000), several of these studies suggest that a focus on disorder
might have a disparate impact on citizens of different races. For example, residents’
perceptions of disorder in Chicago neighborhoods conflate systematically observable
conditions with their neighborhoods’ racial and socioeconomic makeup (Sampson and
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Raudenbush, 2004). The association between race, poverty, and perceived disorder is
significant in residents of all racial and ethnic backgrounds; race and concentrated poverty
predict both local residents’ and outsiders’ perceptions of disorder even more strongly than
does systematically observed disorder. And the effect grows stronger as the concentration
of poverty and minority groups increase.
So, the concentration of “order maintenance” policing in poor places with high
concentrations of poor residents should come as no surprise: order-maintenance policing
strategies ostensibly targeted at “disorderly” neighborhoods were in fact focused on
minority neighborhoods, characterized by social and economic disadvantage (Fagan and
Davies 2000). This racial bait and switch with disorder is fundamental to understanding
the broad spatial and social patterns of policing in New York in the past decade. Most
interesting and important is the persistence of these policies even as the objective indicia of
poverty and disorder fade in what we show below is a steadily improving and safe City.
B. Approaches to Studying Police Stops
Recent empirical evidence on police stops supports perceptions among minority
citizens that police disproportionately stop African American and Hispanic motorists, and
that once stopped, these citizens are more likely to be searched or arrested (Cole, 1999;
Veneiro and Zoubeck, 1999; Harris, 1999; Zingraff et al., 2000; Gross and Barnes, 2002;
Weitzer and Tuch, 2006; Tyler and Fagan, 2008). For example, surveys with nationwide
probability samples, completed in 1999, 2002, and 2005 showed that African-Americans
were far more likely than other Americans to report being stopped on the highways by
police (Langan et al., 2001, Durose et al., 2005, 2007). Each survey showed that minority
drivers also were more likely to report being arrested, handcuffed, or searched by police,
and that they more often were threatened with force or had force used against them. These
disparities in stop rates exact high social costs that, according to Loury (2002), animate
culturally meaningful forms of stigma that reinforce racial inequalities, especially in the
practice of law enforcement. These stigma often translate into withdrawal of minority
populations from cooperation with the police and other legal authorities in the coproduction of security (Tyler and Huo, 2002; Tyler and Fagan, 2008).
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Traffic violations often serve as the rationale or pretext for stops of motorists
(Walker, 2001, Harris, 2002), just as “suspicious behavior” is the spark for both pedestrian
and traffic stops (Alpert et al., 2005; Ayres, 2008). As with traffic violations, the range of
suspicious behaviors is broad enough to challenge efforts to identify an appropriate
baseline to which to compare race-specific stop rates (see Miller, 2000, Smith and Alpert,
2002, and Gould and Mastrofski, 2004). Pedestrian stops are at the very core of policing,
used to enforce narcotics and weapons laws, to identify fugitives or other persons for
whom warrants may be outstanding, to investigate reported crimes and “suspicious”
behavior, and to improve community quality of life. For the NYPD, a “stop” intervention
provides an occasion for the police to have contact with persons presumably involved in
low-level criminality without having to effect a formal arrest, and under the lower
constitutional standard of “reasonable suspicion” (Spitzer, 1999). Indeed, because lowlevel “quality of life” and misdemeanor offenses were more likely to be committed in the
open, the “reasonable suspicion” standard is more easily satisfied in these sorts of crimes
(Rudovsky, 2001, 2008).
Two distinct approaches characterize recent efforts to model and understand racial
disparities in police stops. Each focuses less on identifying racial bias than on
understanding the role of race in explaining patterns of police behavior. Attributing bias is
difficult: causal claims about discrimination would require far more information than the
typical administrative (observational) datasets can supply. For example, when Officer
McFadden stopped suspect Terry in the events leading to the landmark 1968 U.S. Supreme
Court decision in Terry v Ohio, he used his law enforcement “experience” to interpret
Terry’s behavior in front of the jewelry store.1 Were McFadden’s notions of “suspicious”
1

The facts of the case and its doctrinal implications have been the subject of intense interest in both
constitutional criminal procedure, caselaw and legal scholarship. On October 31, 1963, Cleveland police
detective Martin McFadden saw two men (John W. Terry and Richard Chilton) standing on a street corner
and acting suspiciously. One man would walk past a certain store window, stare in, walk on a short distance,
turn back, stare in the store window again, and walk back to the other man and converse for a short period of
time. The two men repeated this ritual alternately between five and six times apiece—in all, roughly a dozen
trips. Each completion of the route was followed by a conference between the two on a corner, at one of
which they were joined by a third man who left swiftly. Suspecting the two men of casing the store for a
robbery, McFadden followed them and saw them rejoin the third man a couple of blocks away. The officer
approached the three men, identified himself as a policeman, and asked their names. When they “mumbled
something” in response, McFadden patted them down for weapons and discovered that Terry and Chilton
were armed. He removed their guns and arrested them for carrying concealed weapons. When the trial court

Street Stops and Broken Windows Revisited
Page 10

behavior skewed by his longtime work in poor and minority neighborhoods? Was the
timing of the event – shortly after the closing of the store – or the location – a deserted part
of the downtown area – influential? What role did Terry’s and McFadden’s race play?
Would Terry’s actions have been interpreted differently if he were white? If McFadden
were Black? If the store was in a residential neighborhood instead of downtown? In a
minority neighborhood or a predominantly white one? The multiplicity of interacting
factors complicated the identification of the role of race in the decision to detain Terry
(Kennedy, 1995), but several analyses of the facts and jurisprudence of Terry suggest that
the Supreme Court opinion discounted the influence of race in the opinion (Thompson,
1999; Carbado, 2002; Carbado and Gulati, 2000; Roberts, 1999; Rudovsky, 2007).
In Terry, it would difficult to identify race alone, apart from the context in which
race was observed, as the factor that animated McFadden’s decision to stop and frisk
suspect Terry. Instead, reliable evidence of ethnic or racial bias in these instances would
require experimental designs that control for these competing and interacting factors –
situational context, demeanor of suspect – so as to isolate differences in outcomes that
could only be attributed to race or ethnicity. Such experiments are routinely used in tests
of discrimination in housing and employment (see, for example, Pager, 2003, 2007;
Thacher 2008). But observational studies that lack such controls are often embarrassed by
omitted variable biases: few studies can control for all the variables that police consider in
deciding whether to stop or search someone, much less their several combinations or
permutations. Research in situ that relies on direct observation of police behavior (e.g.,
Gould and Mastrofski, 2004, Alpert et al., 2005) requires officers to articulate the reasons
for their actions, a task that is vulnerable to numerous validity threats. Sampling
considerations, as well as the presence of the researchers in the context of the decision,
also challenge the validity of observational studies.
The first approach to studying racial disparities bypasses the question of whether
police intend to discriminate on the basis of ethnicity or race, and instead focuses on
disparate impacts of police stop strategies. This strategy is prevalent in studies of
decisions in the context of highways stops. In this approach, comparisons of “hit rates”, or
denied his motion to suppress, Terry pleaded not guilty, but the court found him guilty and sentenced him to
one to three years in prison.
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efficiencies in the proportion of stops that yield positive results, serve as evidence of
disparate impacts of police stops. This type of analysis has been used in several studies,
including Knowles, Persico, and Todd (2001), Ayres (2002a,b), Gross and Barnes (2002),
and many other studies of police behaviors on highways (see, e.g., Durlauf, 2006). This
approach bypasses the supply-side question of who is stopped (and for what reason), and
instead looks only at disparate impacts or outcomes for different groups.
Outcome tests are agnostic with respect to race-based motivations for stops or
frisks versus a search for efficiency and deterrence (Ayres, 2002b; Dominitz and Knowles,
2006). They can show when a particular policy or decision-making outcome has a
disparate impact whose racial disproportionality is not justified by heightened institutional
productivity, negating an efficiency rationale. In the context of profiling, outcome tests
assume that the ex post probability that a police search will uncover drugs or other
contraband is a function of the degree of probable cause that police use in deciding to stop
and search a suspect (Ayres, 2002a). If searches of minorities are less productive than
searches of whites, this could be evidence that police have a lower threshold of probable
cause when searching minorities. At the very least, it is a sign of differential treatment of
minorities that in turn produces a disparate impact.
Knowles, Persico, and Todd (2001) consider this “hit rate” approach theoretically
as well as empirically in a study finding that, of the drivers on Interstate 95 in Maryland
stopped by police on suspicion of drug trafficking, African Americans were as likely as the
whites to have drugs in their cars. Their theoretical analysis posits a dynamic process that
considers the behaviors of police and citizens of different races, and integrates their
decisions in equilibrium where police calibrate their behavior to the probabilities of
detecting illegal behavior, and citizens in different racial groups adjust their propensities to
accommodate the likelihood of detection. They concluded that the search for drugs was an
efficient allocation of police resources, despite the disparate impacts of these stops on
minority citizens (Lamberth, 1997, Ayres, 2002a, Gross and Barnes, 2002).
Outcome tests can be constructed as quasi-experiments, with race as a treatment, to
identify the role of race in the selection of citizens for searches. Ridgeway (2007) matched
suspects within officers to compare the post-stop outcomes of white suspects to those of
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minority suspects in similar locations, stopped at similar times and for the same reasons.
He reports no differences in post-stop arrests (“hit rates”) despite the greater number of
stops of non-whites. But this approach seeks to explain away contextual variables,
especially neighborhood context, rather than explicitly incorporate these factors in an
identification strategy. Close and Mason (2007) construct a disparate outcome quasiexperiment to identify the role of race in police searches by comparing the preferences of
officers of different races to search motorists, controlling for the motorist’s race. They use
both an outcomes-based non-parametric (quasi-experimental) analysis and a standard
benchmarking parametric (regression) approach, and report both personal biases and police
cultural bias in their propensity to search African American and Latino drivers.
These are useful but limited strategies. The robustness of these designs is
compromised, by the omission of several factors – some unobservable and others usually
absent from administrative data – that might bias their claims, such as racial differences in
the attributes that police consider when deciding which motorists or pedestrians to stop,
search or arrest (see, for example, Alpert et al., 2005, Smith, Makarios and Alpert, 2006),
or differences in police behavior in neighborhoods or other social contexts with different
racial makeup (Smith, 1986; Fagan and Davies 2000; Alpert et al., 2005). For example,
Ridgeway (2007) estimated the proportionality of police stops of citizens based on victim
reports of suspect race. This is a sound strategy, but only for the approximately 20% of
stops based on a rationale of “fits suspect description” (see, for example, Spitzer, 1999),
and only if we are confident in the accuracy of victim identification of the suspect(s) and
the accompanying classification of race.2
The omission of neighborhood context also biases estimates of the proportionality
of police stops of citizens. The randomizing equilibrium assumptions in the Persico et al.
approach – that both police and potential offenders adjust their behavior in response to the
2

The procedure to generate a stop rationale takes place pursuant to the stop, not before, and therefore may be
endogenous to the stop. Except in “radio runs,” where officers are dispatched to a crime scene or location
based on a citizen report or a report by another officer and where a suspect description is provided by the
dispatcher, the classification of a stop as being motivated by the match between a citizen and a “suspect
description” is determined after the stop is concluded and the UF-250 form is completed. There is no method
to verify the basis for the formation of suspicion for the stop. And since many stops are generated simply
because the suspect “looked like a perp” (Bacon, 2009), there is considerable potential for error and
theoretical misspecification. To put it less politely or scientifically, the stated rationale for the stop may in
fact be either racialized, highly conditional on the conditions where the stop takes place, or simply a fiction.
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joint probabilities of carrying contraband and being stopped – tend to average across broad
heterogeneous conditions both in police decision making and offenders' propensities to
crime (Dharmapala and Ross, 2004; Durlauf, 2006), and discount the effects of racespecific sensitivities toward crime decisions under varying conditions of detection risk via
police stop (Alpert et al., 2005; Dominitz and Knowles, 2006). When these two concerns
are addressed, Dharmapala and Ross (2004) identify different types of equilibria that lead
to different conclusions about racial prejudice in police stops and searches.
Accordingly, the nature and extent of racial bias in the policing of motorists and
pedestrians remains unsettled empirically (Persico and Todd, 2005; Antonovics and
Knight, 2004; Bjerk, 2004; Donohue and Levitt, 2001, Close and Mason, 2007). Supplyside issues, both in the number and characteristics of the persons available for stops by
virtue of law violation or even suspicious behavior, complicate the search game paradigm
by skewing the population of stopped drivers according to the ex ante probabilities of
criminality that police officers assign to different racial groups. Institutional or individual
differences in the goals of law enforcement may also create heterogeneity both in the
selection of individuals to be stopped and the decisions to engage them in searches for
drugs, weapons, or other contraband. Officers may pursue one set of law enforcement
goals for one group – maximizing arrests – while pursuing a different set of goals –
minimizing crime – for another. Racial nepotism or antagonism may lead to differences in
police stop and search behaviors when officers of one race face choices as to stop or search
a driver of the same or a different racial or ethnic group (Close and Mason, 2007).
These complexities illustrate the difficulty of identifying the role of race in
producing racial disparities in stops and searches, and suggest a second approach that
incorporates the contexts in which individual officers consider race in their everyday
interactions with citizens. Gelman et al. (2007) and Alpert et al. (2005) show how
neighborhood context influences both the attribution of suspicion that animates an
encounter and the outcomes of police-citizen encounters. The institutional context of
policing also may influence individual officers’ decisions through by stigmatizing
neighborhoods as “high crime” or disorderly, skewing how officers perceive and interpret
the actions of citizens. Institutional cultures also may implicitly tolerate such perceptual or
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cognitive schema and internalize them into policy preferences and strategic decisions, as
well as internal preferences for reward, promotion or discipline. These contextual
concerns, informed by crime plus social and demographic dimensions of neighborhoods,
suggest the second approach, one that explicitly incorporates either a multilevel approach
that examines officer-place interactions, or shifts the focus from the actions of individual
officers and individual suspects to the behaviors of cohorts of officers who collectively
patrol neighborhoods with measurable attributes that incorporate race and ethnicity, and
where aggregation biases from racial concentration may shape officers’ priors about crime
and thresholds of suspicion.
These issues inform several features of the analyses reported in this chapter. First,
to explain the distribution and predictors of street stops and then of arrests (“hit rates”), we
focus on neighborhoods, not individual officers. Neighborhoods are urban places that are
the focal point of the underlying theories of order maintenance policing. Place also is the
unit of analysis for the allocation and deployment of police resources, and neighborhood
crime rates are the metrics by which the resources of the police are managed and evaluated.
Place also imparts meaning to the interpretation of routine actions and movements of
citizens, whether local residents or outsiders whose appearance may evoke special
attention. And, the benchmark of the social composition of place, in conjunction with
actual crime, is sensitive to the actual allocation of police resources as well as tactical
decisions by the NYPD, and is widely used in research on selective enforcement in
policing (Alpert et al., 2005; Fagan, 2002; Fridell, 2004; Skogan and Frydl, 2004).
Next, we use address supply-side and omitted-variable problems by controlling for
the prevalence of the targeted behaviors in patrolled areas, assessing whether stop and
search rates exceed what we would predict from knowledge of local criminal activity. This
responds to the benchmark problem in research on selective enforcement. This approach
requires estimates of the supply of individuals who are engaged in the targeted behaviors,
and the extent of racial disproportionality is likely to depend on the benchmark used to
measure criminal behavior (see Miller, 2000; Fagan and Davies, 2000; Walker, 2001;
Smith and Alpert, 2002; Ayres, 2008; Durlauf, 2006; Ridgeway and MacDonald, in this
volume). Ideally, we would know race-specific crime rates in each social area to
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disaggregate benchmarks by race and ethnicity. However, we observed practical problems
in this approach. For example, clearance rates vary by crime type, and so the race of
suspects is often unknown. Fewer than one in four stops in 2007 were based on a match
between the person detained and a suspect description known to the police (Ridgeway,
2007). And, suspected crimes that animate a large share of stops, such as weapons or drug
possession, often do not follow from crime reports that identify the race of a suspect, so
these base rates of offending are unknown.
Accordingly, we use homicide arrests as a measure of reported crime. Homicide
victimization and arrests are stably measured over time, limiting measurement error. In
New York, its racial distribution – both offending and victimization – is highly correlated
with the demography of the neighborhood where the crime takes place (Fagan and Davies,
2004; Fagan, Wilkinson and Davies, 2007). In New York City, the site of this research,
homicide records are both a strong lag and lead indicator of crime, correlated at .75 or
more with reported crimes for other Part I felonies for the 17 years from 1984-2000.
Homicides also are the most stably and reliably measured indicator of crime over time and
through police administrations, whereas other violent crimes (e.g., aggravated assault) are
subject to classifications biases that vary over time and place (Zimring and Hawkins,
1997).
Following Gelman et al. (2007), we estimate whether the stop rate and “hit rate”
within neighborhoods is predicted by local crime conditions, the physical and social
composition of the neighborhood, or its racial composition. Since race is correlated with
neighborhood composition and crime, we expect that race will not be a significant
predictor either of stop patterns or of efficiency (the rate at which stops that produce
arrests), once we account for crime and other neighborhood conditions. But as we show
below, race does predict stop rates and hit rates, after controlling for crime and local
conditions. Is this evidence of racial animus, targeted collectively by officers in a
neighborhood or through institutional and administrative levers that mark minority
neighborhoods characterized by their racial or ethnic composition as worthy of heightened
suspicion? The fact that police are stopping minorities, and others in minority
neighborhoods, at a higher rate than is justified by local crime conditions does not require
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that we infer that police engaged in disparate treatment–but, at a minimum, it is evidence
that whatever criteria the police employed produced an unjustified racially disparate
impact.

III. DATA AND METHODS
A. Data
We examine changes in OMP enforcement patterns beginning with the period
examined by Spitzer (1999), Fagan and Davies (2000) and Gelman et al. (2007).
Including that period (1998-99), we examine three distinct periods, termed the “early”
(1998-1999), “middle” (2002-2004) and “recent” (2005-2006) periods respectively. In
each period, data on stop activity are based on records from the New York Police
Department. The department has a policy of keeping records on stops (on “UF-250
Forms”) (see Spitzer, 1999, and Daniels v City of New York, 2003); this information was
collated for all stops from January 1998 through March 1999, and the 2003 and 2006
calendar years. Stops are recorded and aggregated for each precinct. Appendix A
discusses the legal requirements for a stop, frisk and arrest pursuant to a stop. Data on
stops, frisks and arrests from 2003-2007 were made publicly available by the NYPD
following a Freedom of Information Law (FOIL) request and subsequent court order
(NYCLU, 2008). Data from the “early” period were published in Spitzer (1998-9) and
Fagan and Davies (2000).
Stop rates are analyzed in the context of citywide crime, demographic, and
socioeconomic conditions. We use total stop rates (undifferentiated by suspected crime)
and disaggregated by the race of person stopped. We use two measures of crime in the
preceding year. First, in the figures, we use reported homicides in the police precinct in
the preceding year as the measure of crime. This lagged function allows us to avoid
simultaneity concerns from using contemporaneous measures of crime and police actions.
Second, in the multivariate models, we use homicide arrests as the marker of crime.
We measure homicides for the “early” period using the NYPD’s arrest and
complaint file, and the city’s COMPSTAT records for the “middle” and “recent” periods.
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In the multivariate estimates in Tables 2 and 3, we use lagged homicide arrests in each
neighborhood as the benchmark for estimating the proportionality of police stops and
frisks. There are obvious strengths and weaknesses in this measure. Arrests are subject to
police preferences for allocation, and also to police skills in identifying and capturing
offenders. Homicide arrests also may vary by neighborhood based on externalities such as
the extent of citizen cooperation with police investigations. Arrests also are vulnerable to
measurement error: they often are reduced to other charges when evidence is too
inconclusive to sustain a murder charge, or may charges may be over-graded only to be
corrected later based on a review of legal sufficiency. But arrests also have strengths as a
measure of crime. Reported homicides and homicide arrests are highly correlated over
time across police precincts in New York: the partial correlation by month and precinct
from 1989 through 2001 was .952.3 This endogeneity of crime and policing within
neighborhoods captures the preferences of police to allocate resources to particular areas in
the search for offenders. Also, homicide arrests are a strong indicator of both arrests and
complaints for other serious crimes.4 To the extent that crime in the prior year is influenced
both by crime and the policing that it attracts, the use of arrests as a measure of both the
presence of police and of local crime conditions avoids omitted-variable problems when
using only measures of reported crimes. Finally, arrest trends in preceding periods
incorporate the priors of both individual officers and their supervisors as well as
neighborhood characteristics, and in fact may capture officers’ propensities to stop citizens
based on the joint influence of individual and neighborhood racial markers.
We also incorporate demographic and socioeconomic variables in each area that
might compete with or moderate crime as influences on stop activity: concentrated
neighborhood disadvantage, residential turnover, and ethnic heterogeneity have each been
associated with low levels of neighborhood collective efficacy and informal social control.
3

We preferred to use both homicide arrests and homicides to test the robustness of our estimates, as well as a
wider range of localized crime rates. Unfortunately, we were not privileged by the NYPD with access to its
data of reported crimes that could be disaggregated to precincts, neighborhoods and subboros. Those data
were not published by the NYPD in summary form after 2001.
4
The partial correlations by year and precinct from 1984-2000 between homicide arrests and arrests for other
Part I felony crimes was .633, and .711 for all felony crimes. For crime complaints, the partial correlation by
year and precinct from 1984-2000 between homicide arrests and crime-specific complaints were .810 for
murder, .704 for rape, .629 for robbery, and .791 for assault.
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These are both indicia of perceived disorder (Sampson and Raudenbush, 1999) and risk
factors for violent crime (Fagan and Davies, 2004). More important, Fagan and Davies
(2000) showed that these were salient predictors of stop activities in the “early” period, and
we examine their influences over time as time-varying predictors. Areas in which these
phenomena are concentrated might therefore be unable to informally regulate local
residents, requiring law enforcement agencies to impose formal social control instead and
leading to greater search activity.
Demographic and socioeconomic data for each period is based on the New York
City Housing and Vacancy Survey (HVS), a survey completed every three years by the
city’s Department of Housing Preservation and Development, in cooperation with the U.S.
Bureau of the Census (http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/nychvs/nychvs.html).
We analyze the 1999, 2002, and 2005 waves of the survey to generate baseline estimates of
neighborhood social and economic status. Each wave of the survey covers approximately
18,000 housing units, classified into 55 “subboros”, based on the Public Use Microdata
Areas (PUMAs) for New York City (Community Studies of New York, 2007). We used
shape files provided by the New York City Department of City Planning to reconcile the
subboro boundaries with the police precincts (see Fagan and Davies, 2000). In the small
number of precincts where there was overlap in the boundaries, precincts were assigned to
the subboro that contained the majority of its population.
B. Base Rates and Citywide Trends
A quick look at the data on New York City neighborhoods suggests that the social
and demographic makeup of the City has changed significantly since 1999. Table 1 shows
that the city’s racial and ethnic makeup has become far more diverse. The bulk of the
city’s population growth has come from racial and ethnic minorities, plus a notable
increase among immigrants. Individual neighborhoods have also become more integrated,
as shown by the increase in neighborhood entropy. At the same time, socioeconomic
conditions have improved, with a sharp decline in both public assistance receipt and
neighborhood levels of physical disorder.
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Even as the city has changed demographically and improved socioeconomically,
stops and searches have become far more prevalent. Figure 1 shows the average
neighborhood – subboro – stop rate, computed as stops per household. We use household
because this is the population parameter in the HVS in each analysis period. While city
residents of all races have become increasingly likely to be stopped by the police, stop
rates vary dramatically by race, with blacks more than twice as likely to be stopped as
either whites or Hispanics. The increase in stop activity is particularly striking when
considering that New York City crime rates fell dramatically between 1999 and 2005. As
shown in Figure 2, homicide arrests in the city fell by more than 50% between 1999 and
2002, and, albeit with a slight increase, remained low in 2005.
Following the examples of Knowles et al. (2001) Ayres (2002a,b), Gross and
Barnes (2002), Gelman et al (2007), and Ridgeway (2007), we measure the effectiveness
of street stops by their “hit rates”, the rate at which stops result in arrests. Figure 3a-c, like
Figure 1, presents average neighborhood stop rates per household in each of the three time
periods of interest, disaggregated by race, with average hit rates overlaid onto the graph.
And since crime rates remained relatively stable across the period, there is no evidence that
the increase in stops contribute to crime minimization. While not as pronounced as the
differences in stop rates, hit rates also suggest substantial racial disparities. Figure 3b
shows that even as as stop rates have increased dramatically for Blacks from 2003 to 2006,
hit rates have fallen steadily, suggesting that the increase in stop activity has added little
value in maximizing efficiency via generating arrests. Stops of whites appear more likely
than stops of blacks to lead to arrest, suggesting that blacks are disproportionately
subjected to stops, with little public safety payoff.
C. Stop Activity by Neighborhood
Stop rates have not only increased dramatically, but between-neighborhood
differences in stop rates have become far more pronounced. Figure 4 displays one data
point for each of the 55 HVS subboros in each period, each representing the average
neighborhood stop rate per household in each year. We also show the count of homicides
citywide over the same period. While earlier studies have identified neighborhoods that
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have the greatest racial disparity in stop and frisk practices, Figure 4 shows that the
dramatic growth in average stop rates from 2003 to 2006 is explained by extreme increases
in a subset of neighborhoods with high rates of African American and Latino residents:
Brownsville, East New York, Central Harlem, East Harlem, Bedford-Stuyvesant, Mott
Haven. Although some of this increase may be due to improved reporting pursuant to the
Daniels consent decree in December 2003, it is curious that all the improved reporting was
concentrated in neighborhoods with the highest non-white populations in the City. These
neighborhoods are predominantly African American, according to the Department of City
Planning. 5 Given the degree of racial segregation across New York City neighborhoods,
we address this disparity below by examining neighborhood-level drivers of stop activity.
Figures 14.5a-c suggest that neighborhood racial composition explains not only
stop activity, but also hit rates and stop efficacy. Each figure shows, for 1999, 2003, and
2006, respectively, a LOWESS-smoothed estimate of the relationship between hit rates and
the percent black in each of the 55 neighborhoods for each period of time. As in Figure
14.3, these graphs suggest that hit rates are falling over time in stops of all racial groups.
However, particularly in 2006, the year where between-neighborhood differences are most
pronounced, there is a visible difference in neighborhoods with the highest concentrations
of black households. In neighborhoods where 60% of households (or more) are black,
stops are not only less effective than in more mixed or white neighborhoods, but hit rates
are particularly low in stops of black and Hispanic individuals.
D. Modeling Strategy
1. Predicting Stop Activity
5

The stop rate and racial and ethnic distribution in these areas are:
Stops per
Percent
Household African
Percent
Neighborhood
2006
American
Latino
Brownsville-Ocean Hill
.68
78
15
East New York
.65
45
38
Central Harlem
.52
71
14
East Harlem
.51
36
45
Bedford Stuyvesant
.49
72
16
Mott Haven/Hunts Point
.44
21
76
Source: New York City, Department of City Planning
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Given the between-neighborhood disparities shown in Figure 4, we examine stop
activity at the neighborhood level to identify factors that explain between-neighborhood
differences both within periods and over time. Following Gelman et al. (2007), we
estimate a series of Poisson regressions to predict the number of stops conducted in each
neighborhood in each time period. The racial disparities shown in Figures 1 and 3 may be
driven not by race, but rather by differences in neighborhood social conditions where
blacks, whites, and Hispanics are concentrated, or by differences in their ex ante crime
conditions. If, for example, the police make more stops in high-crime areas, but treat
individuals similarly within similarly situated localities, racial disparities in stop rates
could be explained entirely by neighborhood crime conditions. Or, the NYPD’s focus on
“broken windows” and order-maintenance policing might lead stop activity to be most
prevalent in neighborhoods with disorderly conditions (Wilson and Kelling 1982, Kelling
and Cole 1996). We therefore estimate a model where the stop count yi in neighborhood i
is distributed based on predictors X, with an expected value of:
E[yi|Xi] = eXβ
The vector X includes a measure of neighborhood crime (homicide arrests, lagged),
and several socioeconomic characteristics we expect to be correlated with crime rates and
policing practices. First, we explicitly control for crime conditions in the previous year,
using the number of homicide arrests in each neighborhood. To reflect the NYPD focus on
disorder in the 1990s and early 2000s, we estimated and control for a single principal
components factor (computed for each year) that summarizes the physical condition
(“broken windows,” literally) of local residences (based on the percent of buildings whose
windows, walls, floors, and stairways have problems visible to outside observers). The
disorder theories animating OMP strategies considered both physical and social disorder as
cues of weak informal social control and low guardianship of neighborhoods. We consider
only physical disorder since some elements of social disorder – e.g., fighting, visible drug
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use—are in fact crimes and would be correlated with stop activity.6 Also, physical
disorder tends to be highly correlated with social disorder, and its component behaviors
including public intoxication, loitering, and fighting. These are targeted in OMP as a
wedge to reduce crime opportunities and to identify persistent criminals (Sampson and
Raudenbush 1999). To reflect the likelihood that police activity is higher in more
populated areas, we control for the logged number of households in each neighborhood.
We also control for traditional and temporally stable predictors of neighborhood
crime (Shaw and McKay 1942; Sampson and Lauritsen, 1994; Land et al., 1990; Fagan
and Davies, 2004, Fagan, 2008; Kirk and Laub, in press): concentrated disadvantage
(measured by the percent of households receiving public assistance), residential instability
(measured by the percent of families who have moved to the their current residence within
five years, and by the residential vacancy rates), ethnic diversity (measured with the
percent of residents who are black and Hispanic, the percent who are foreign-born, and a
measure of entropy, which captures the degree of ethnic heterogeneity in the
neighborhood). However, we expect that these factors will be correlated with police
activity only to the extent that they predict crime; once crime conditions are controlled for,
there should be no marginal relationship between social structure and stop activity.
Variables (with the exception of logged population) are standardized to a mean of zero and
variance of 1, and neighborhood observations are weighted based on the number of
households in each.
To assess the extent to which neighborhood conditions, and their influence on
policing, change over time, we first estimate three separate cross-sectional models, one for
each time period. We then combine the observations into a pooled cross section (Model
4), and add controls for year fixed effects in Model 5. Model 6 contains year fixed effects
and random intercepts to account for neighborhood differences. Although the city has
changed dramatically over the period of analysis, and stop activity has increased
dramatically over time, the crime, disorder, and socioeconomic predictors vary far more
between neighborhoods than they do within neighborhoods over time, and these
6

When arrests are made by the police upon observation of a crime, such as smoking marijuana, a stop-report
is completed to back-fill the case record. Accordingly, some portion of both crime complaints and stops
reflect arrest-generated activity rather than independent police events.
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differences – at least in ordinal position – are stable over time (see, for another example,
Sampson and Morenoff, 2006). Accordingly, we rejected the option to control for
neighborhood fixed effects in Model 6, preferring instead to focus on differences between
neighborhoods. Controlling for neighborhood fixed effects would identify the relationship
between crime and stop activity, and social structure and stop activity, solely from the
perspective of within-neighborhood variation. Because we acknowledge that the allocation
of police resources is determined by differences between neighborhoods, Model 6 is
specified to reflect between-neighborhood differences, with random intercepts and
standard errors clustered by neighborhood.
2. Predicting Stop Effectiveness
We next examine the crime and socioeconomic conditions predicting stop
effectiveness, the “hit rate” at which stops lead to arrests. We expect that this rate might
be tied to the same conditions of crime and disorder that predict stop activity, since “excess
stops” above the crime rate are likely to be concentrated in poor neighborhoods with
concentrations of minority population. Accordingly, we estimate a series of linear
probability models using the predictors detailed above. However, as we hypothesize with
stop activity, in the case of race-neutral policing, hit rates should not be significantly
related to neighborhood social structure. For these analyses, we estimate the effects of
neighborhood racial composition on stop rates using both neighborhood fixed effects and
also, as above, using random intercepts.

IV. RESULTS
A. Explaining Neighborhood Differences in Stop Rates
Table 14.2 shows the relationship between neighborhood conditions and the
incidence of street stops. Models 1-3 show results for each year. As expected, stops are
more frequent in neighborhoods in which crime is more prevalent for all years, but in
larger neighborhoods only in 1999. Controlling for homicides, stops are more frequent in
neighborhoods with higher Black populations. The effect size is fairly stable across years,
even as the overall number of stops rose over time. Model 4 is a pooled cross-sectional
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model for all years, with no controls for time. Standard errors are clustered by
neighborhoods. The effect for Black population remains significant, and population is
again significant when the three time periods are pooled.
Model 5 includes year fixed effects, but not neighborhood fixed effects, and the
standard errors are clustered by neighborhood. The results are unchanged from Model 4.
The year fixed effects for 2003 and 2006 are significant, reflecting the increase in the stops
in the subboros in those periods relative to the 1999 rate. Physical disorder is not
significant, nor are the majority of other covariates that characterize neighborhoods.
However, stops are more frequent in areas with higher concentrations of public assistance
receipt, and with higher Black populations, after controlling for homicides and physical
disorder. Since homicide rates in New York and physical disorder are correlated with
Black population concentration (Fagan and Davies, 2000, 2004), we estimated models
including interaction terms for percent black and local disorder conditions (physical
disorder). The relationship of Black population and the stop rate is robust to the inclusion
of either interaction term (data available from authors).
Thus far, Model 5 shows a strong and significant relationship between
neighborhood racial composition and stop activity; police stop significantly more people in
neighborhoods with more Black households. Given that the all predictors are standardized,
with the exception of the logged number of households, the coefficient magnitudes suggest
a particularly strong relationship; racial composition is as important as local crime
conditions in predicting police stop activity.
In Model 6, we re-estimated Model 5 with random intercepts to account for the
heterogeneity of neighborhoods in crime, stops and other social conditions. We also
included an autoregression term to account for strong temporal correlation in both stops
and crime over time. The results are unchanged from Model 5, although the model fit
improves and the constant is much smaller.
For Model 6, we also included two types of sensitivity analyses. First, we
estimated the models including interactions of percent black by lagged crime and percent
Hispanic by lagged crime. The results were unchanged. Next, recognizing the potential
endogeneity of crime, disorder, neighborhood social and racial composition and stop rates,
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we estimated propensity scores for the racial composition measures and included them as
predictors (results available from the authors). We estimated propensity scores to predict
separately the Hispanic and black concentrations in each neighborhood, with predictors
including the demographic and crime variables for each neighborhood, and fixed effects
for year. We then re-estimated Model 6 to include these propensity scores together with
the main racial composition predictor. Following Bang and Robins (2005), we included a
predictor that expressed the propensity scores for each racial composition variable in two
ways:
(1) Xi,j = 1 / PSi,j
(2) Xi,j = 1 / (1-PSi,j)
In equations 1 and 2, X is the expression of the transformed propensity score PSi,j,
the estimated (predicted) racial composition for each race i and in neighborhood j. We
repeated this procedure using the standardized residuals from the propensity score
estimation, creating two additional propensity scores expressions. Again, the results using
these estimators were unchanged (results available from the authors). Accordingly, the
results in Table 14.2 are robust with respect to a variety of controls and specifications of
the local crime and social conditions that might influence stop rates.
We also estimated Model 6 using both neighborhood and year fixed effects, but the
model fits were unacceptably poor and the results uninterpretable. Which modeling
strategy produces the most accurate and reliable accounting for the relationship among
neighborhood, crime and stop activity? Which is a more accurate identification strategy
for estimating the effects of policing on neighborhoods? We are confident in the results in
Models 5 and 6, and reject the use of a neighborhood fixed effects model, for four reasons.
First, as mentioned earlier, while there were strong within-neighborhood neighborhood
changes over time, the relative position of neighborhoods in terms of both crime and
concentrated socio-economic disadvantage over time was largely unchanged. In other
words, the worst places still are the worst places – the places with the highest homicide
rates still are the places with the highest homicide rates, the places with the highest
concentration of physical disorder are still the places with the most bad housing, vacant

Street Stops and Broken Windows Revisited
Page 26

lots, etc., even as the extent of disorder in those places dissipates over time. Neighborhood
fixed effects are helpful in identifying differences between places, but such differences are
likely to be unimportant in this analysis. Inclusion of fixed effects for neighborhoods in
this context would overdetermine the model, explaining everything and nothing at the
same time.
Second, the neighborhoods are changing over time, but the rates of change are
dissimilar. The social, economic and crime conditions in poorer neighborhoods changed
more than in wealthier neighborhoods (Fagan, 2008). The assumptions of stable betweenunit rates of change in fixed effects models are challenged under these conditions. Third,
fixed effects estimators are quite limited when the possibility exists of dynamic selection,
or changes in the circumstances that or preferences that would affect the assignment of the
intervention – police stops, in this case – over time (Bjerk, 2008). Dynamic selection is
intrinsic to the policy preferences in the allocation of police resources and tactics in the
OMP model (Bratton and Knobler, 1998; Silverman, 1999). This in turn leads to our
fourth concern: we think that fixed effects models in this context ask the wrong question.
Our interest here is estimating the probabilities of being stopped in neighborhoods of
different racial makeup and crime conditions, not with differentials by race of persons
within neighborhoods. In other words, ours is a within-neighborhood design, and we seek
to explain differences in stop probabilities that are quite dramatic across places and over
time.
B. The Efficiency of Street Stops in Detecting Crime
Table 14.3 presents the relationship between neighborhood conditions and “hit
rates”, or the percent of stops that lead to arrests. As suggested earlier, by Figures 14.3 and
14.5a-5c, stop efficacy has declined over the period of analysis, a trend underscored by the
year fixed effects in Models 5 and 6. We would expect that neighborhood hit rates, driven
by the likelihood of stopped residents to be engaged in illegal activity, would not be tied to
neighborhood social structure; however, Models 1-5 show that arrests per stop are lower in
neighborhoods whose populations are predominantly Black: over time, stops in
predominantly Black neighborhoods are significantly less productive in yielding arrests
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than in other parts of the city. Table 14.2 shows that stops are fare more prevalent in these
areas, to a degree beyond what differential criminal activity would suggest; the models in
Table 14.3 suggest that there is little public safety payoff and perhaps public safety costs in
predominantly black neighborhoods. The first five specifications show that arrest rates are
lower in neighborhoods with higher concentrations of black population. However, the
results in Model 6 suggest that race is no longer a significant predictor of hit rates when we
treat neighborhoods as fixed effects. But when we estimate model 6 using random
intercepts and population-averaged models, we obtain the same results as in Model 5:
arrest rates are significantly lower in neighborhoods with greater black population (for
percent Black, b=-.013, s.e.=.005, p=.017). Again, we face the same issues in interpretation
with respect to the neighborhood fixed effects models, and for the same reasons as
discussed earlier, we reject the neighborhood fixed effects model in favor of other
identification strategies that rely on clustering of standard errors by neighborhood and
population-averaged models.
Finally, to put the hit rate analysis in perspective of gains and losses, we computed
the number of firearms obtained from stops. In 2003, a total of 633 firearms were seized
pursuant to stops, a rate of 3.9 firearms per 1,000 stops. More than 90 percent of the
firearms seized were pistols. By 2006, following a 300% increase in the number of stops,
the seizure rate fell to 1.4 firearms seized per 1,000 stops. The rates for blacks, who were
stopped more than 10 times the rate per person compared to whites, the firearm seizure
rates were slightly higher: 4.6 firearms seized per 1,000 stops in 2003, and 1.6 seizures per
stop in 2006. The 700 firearms seized in 2006 through stops accounted for about 10
percent of the total number of firearm seizures in New York City that were traced in the
nationwide firearm trace system. On the surface, the expenditure of police resources to
seize only a fraction of seizures made by other means seems inefficient, to say the least.
Since removal of guns from the street was the animating goal of OMP, the low seizure rate
is further evidence of the inefficiency if not futility of the strategy.
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C. How Much is Too Much? How Much is Enough?
The burden of OMP policing in the decade since the Spitzer (1999) report has
fallen disproportionately on African Americans, and, to a lesser extent, on Latinos. The
strategic goal of OMP has principally been a law enforcement goal – maximization of
arrests and punishment. This was evident in the policy memoranda that were issued at that
the outset of the OMP experiment in 1994. Crime minimization goals were pathdependent on the law enforcement goals, rooted in the putative benefits of increased stops
and arrests of citizens for both minor crimes plus the detection of weapons and other
contraband. Through careful allocation of police resources, the focus was on “high crime”
areas, which – in the logic of OMP - were those places with the highest concentrations of
poor, non-white citizens. The high crime area concept has proven to be elastic, though,
and has expanded now to include public housing developments, despite equivocal evidence
that crime in public housing is higher than in the adjacent areas (Fagan and Davies, 1999;
Fagan, Davies and Holland, 2006). The result has been a dramatic increase in street stops
since 2003, with nearly 500,000 New Yorkers stopped in 2006 and 2007. In addition, tens
of thousands of misdemeanor marijuana arrests (Golub et al., 2007; Levine and Small,
2008) are part of the totality of enforcement that nearly blankets some parts of the City.
Crime rates, though, have remained relatively stable in the years since 2003 as
stops have increased. Figure 4 shows that homicide rates have remained stable after 1999,
rising and falling randomly over an eight year period. One might have expected crime
rates to plunge further with the mobilization of OMP tactics, especially with the increase
beginning in 2003, but that hasn’t been the case. After all, a secondary benefit of
maximizing punishment through street stops would be to raise the risk of detection and
arrest for carrying weapons, increasing the deterrent threats of OMP tactics. But we are
hard-pressed to detect such trends, given the stabilility of crime rates. Nor have marijuana
arrests declined, despite the sharp rise in the likelihood of detection and arrest, so New
Yorkers continue to use marijuana, often openly, flouting the law and discounting or
ignoring the risks and consequences of arrests.
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The inelasticity of crime relative to street stops raises two related questions. First,
if crime minimization is the goal of OMP, rather than maximizing punishment without
tangible linkages to crime reduction, how many stops are enough to maintain or lower the
crime rate? Economists and criminologists have long sought algorithms that would create
an optimal level of law enforcement (see, Garoupa, 1997; Polinsky and Shavell, 2000,
2006; Curtis, Hayslett-Mcall and Qiu, 2007) or incarceration (Blumstein and Nagin, 1972)
to control crime. For example, Persico et al. (2001) suggest that an optimal level of police
searches of motorists can achieve an equilibrium across racial groups in the propensities of
motorists to transport drugs or other contraband. So, is 500,000 stops too many? Not
enough to control crime? These are important questions, but we do not address them in
this chapter.
The second question, though, is a first step in the process of answering the first
question. Under current OMP tactics, what is the likelihood of police contact for citizens
of specific racial and ethnic groups? Knowing the exposure of different population groups
to detection and enforcement is a necessary antecedent to discerning whether there is
leverage in these contact rates that can influence crime rates for any population group, or
even for the areas where specific groups are concentrated. And if race, neighborhood and
crime are conflated to shape perceptions of “high crime areas” that merit intensive patrol
and enforcement, we would expect the exposure to be highest for non-whites, and, as we
see in Figure 14.4, for African Americans in particular.
Accordingly, we estimated the probability of contact during 2006 for non-Hispanic
African American males ages 18-19, a group that has been the focus of criminal justice
policy debate and research attention for nearly two decades (Fagan and Wilkinson, 1998;
Cook and Laub, 1998; Loury, 2002; Feld, 1999). There were 28,945 stops in this group
during 2006. The total population in 2006, according to the U.S. Bureau of the Census
(American Community Survey, 2006), was 30,999. Accordingly, the point estimate for
contact is .93, a figure that on its face is shocking. We re-estimated this probability
excluding stops made in police precincts in the City’s central business districts and park
areas: lower Manhattan, Midtown Manhattan (including Times Square), and Central Park.
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With these restrictions, we re-estimated the probability of contact at .92 (28,539 stops).7
This compares to estimates of less than .20 for 18-19 white males and .50 for Hispanic
males (both Black and White Hispanics).
The stop totals are likely to include persons stopped more than once, so we reestimated these probabilities under varying assumptions about the number of persons
stopped more than once and the total number of stops that were repeat stops. Table 14.4a
shows that if 10% of the African American males ages 18-19 were stopped more than once
and these repeaters accounted for 25% of all stops, the probability being stopped by the
police of anyone in this age cohort is now .79. For example, if 10% of the population of
black men aged 18-19 (approximately 3,100 individuals) are considered “high-stop
individuals”, and this group comprises 25% of all stops within this demographic bracket,
then these 3,100 people stopped a combined 7,135 times. These men are stopped an
average of 2.3 times over the course of the year, rather than the 0.92 suggested by the raw
numbers. Assuming the remaining stops (21,404) are distributed one-per-person, the total
number of people stopped over the course of the year would be 24,504. Although the raw
ratio of stops to people in this demographic bracket is 0.92, the actual percent of the
population stopped by the police is lower, 0.79, shown in the upper-left cell of Table 4a. If
25% of the persons were stopped more than once and they accounted for 50% of all stops,
the probability declines to .71. Note that in Table 14.4a, some cells could not be computed
because the total number of stops would exceed the population in that group.8
We next expand the age boundaries for these estimates to include males ages 1824. This age group was disproportionately involved in lethal violence throughout the
1990s in New York (Fagan and Wilkinson, 1998; Fagan et al., 1998) and elsewhere in the
U.S. (Cook and Laub, 1998; Zimring and Hawkins, 1997). Also, desistance from crime

7

In these estimates, we include Black Hispanics among Hispanics, not among African Americans.
Table cells are left blank in cases where the hypothesized population/stop allocations do not correspond to a
“high-stop” population stopped multiple times per year. For example, in Table 4a, the lower-left cell posits a
distribution where 50% of the population accounts for 25% of the stops. If 25% of stops (7,135) were evenly
distributed over 50% of the population (14,270 people) this would roughly correspond to only one-half of a
stop per person. Since police stops are discrete events, an average stop rate of less than one stop per person
suggests that either the “high-stop” population is overestimated, or that the portion of stops allocated to this
group is underestimated. In either case, the cell is left blank, since the combination does not represent a
scenario where a portion of the population is stopped repeatedly.
8
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increases substantially as persons reach their mid-20s (Farrington, 1998). The unadjusted
probability of being stopped in 2006, before accounting for repeaters, is .14 for nonHispanic Whites, .78 for African Americans, .39 for Hispanics. Tables 4b-d show the rates
accounting for different assumptions about the number of repeaters and the number of
repeat stops. Given the lower stop rates of Whites and Hispanics, we rescaled the
probabilities in Tables 4c and 4d, hence the comparisons reflect distributions that are
unique for each racial or ethnic group. Under the most likely scenarios, Tables 14.4b-d
show that when 10% of the persons account for 25% of the stops, the probability that an
African American male is stopped (.69) is still far greater than the probability that a White
or Hispanic male is stopped. Under more restrictive and conservative assumptions – that
50% of the persons account for 75% of the stops, we still estimate rates for African
Americans that are twice the rate of Hispanics.
The important context in which to view these numbers is whether they are
productive. They are not, by any reasonable standard. Figure 14.3 shows two important
features of hit rates: there are only negligible differences between hit rates for Whites,
African Americans or Hispanics, and the rates themselves are approximately five percent.
Beyond the facial evidence of racial disparity, we are also concerned that these
extraordinary stop rates of African Americans include a high volume of excess stops, stops
that express unwarranted blanket suspicion that may have little marginal deterrent or law
enforcement returns. But with stop rates this high and inefficiencies running at 96 percent,
claims of a general deterrent effect from these stops are empirically strained by the scarcity
of sanctions. So, deterrence or crime control may be a secondary goal to maximization of
punishment. And efficiency concerns are only one side of the social and public good of
policing: equity, fairness and distributive considerations co-occupy another dimension of
policing (Moore, 2002). Even if we thought that there were crime control returns, it seems
unlikely that most citizens would condone trading in the private harm of excess stops of
African Americans, not to mention the stigma and internalized psychological costs, against
putatively lower susceptibility to crime for the majoritarian group. The costs of this regime
lie in the harm to the 95% who are innocent in these excess stops.
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V. DISCUSSION
For nearly a decade, through a prolonged era of stably low crime rates and
improving social and economic health across the City’s neighborhoods, the number and
rate of stops of citizens has increased by more than 500 percent while the efficiency of
those stops has declined by nearly 50 percent. The burdens and benefits of these stops are
disproportionately concentrated in the City’s poorest neighborhoods, the places with both
the highest crime rates and the highest proportions of non-White households. Our focus in
this paper is not on the race or ethnicity of individual stops of citizens, but on the rates of
stops in neighborhoods with the highest concentrations of Black residents. We focus on
neighborhoods because place, not individuals, has been most closely linked to the logic of
policing under OMP since its inception 15 years ago. It is place that is the focal point of
the underlying theories of order maintenance policing, place is the unit of analysis for the
allocation and deployment of police resources, and the indicia of crime in places are the
metrics by which the resources of the police are managed and evaluated. And, the
benchmark of place, in conjunction with crime, is sensitive to the actual allocation of
police resources as well as tactical decisions by the NYPD, and is widely used in research
on selective enforcement in policing (Alpert et al., 2005; Fagan, 2002; Fridell, 2004;
Skogan and Frydl, 2004).
The effects we observe in these analyses are notable in three ways. First, stops
within neighborhoods take place at rates in excess of what would be predicted from the
separate and combined effects of population demography, physical and social conditions,
and the crime rate. This excess seems to be concentrated in predominantly Black
neighborhoods. Second, the excess stops in these neighborhoods persist over time, even as
the Black population declines, crime rates remain low and effectively unchanged, the
City’s overall social and economic health improves, and housing and other investments
increase in across the City’s neighborhoods, including its poorest and most segregated
neighborhoods. Third, there appears to be a declining return in crime detection from
marginal increases in enforcement, and this efficiency gap seems to grow over time. Like
the stops that supply the arrests, the declining number of arrests that take place pursuant to
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stops are disproportionately concentrated in neighborhoods with higher Black populations,
after controlling for crime, poverty and disorder in those places.
The preferences for neighborhood selection for intensified stops seem to be
inelastic to changes in crime rates or to the limited payoffs in arrest efficiencies from
marginal increases in stops. This inelasticity is difficult to understand as either individual
preferences of police officers, or as a rational tactical or management decision. As the
rank and file of police in New York become more diverse and reflective of the City’s
demography, it is unlikely that individual preferences or subjective assessments of
suspiciousness by individual officers would continue to be racially skewed over time and
through changes in the social contexts of the areas they patrol.
Institutionally, the declining return to crime control from marginal increases in
stop activity is the opposite of economics. We assume, from the policy statements of police
in New York, that the goal of stops is to minimize and deter crime rather than to maximize
the hit rate of stops. An elastic policy sensitive to crime rates might seek to locate an
optimal level of stop activity within each neighborhood or patrol area and adjust in real
time. Dominitz and Knowles (2006) suggest that such a crime minimization approach
works only if the priors of illegal behavior are known to vary across groups in specific
ways. Perhaps the absence of assumptions or knowledge of specific variation in betweengroup (and by extension, between-neighborhood) crime preferences explains the
persistence of these stop patterns. But we doubt that the NYPD is flying blind, since the
allocation of police to neighborhoods and smaller areas is driven by real-time data about
group- or area-specific crime rates.
So, there is no simple explanation for the exponential growth over time in stops in
the face of broad, long-term secular declines in crimes across all population groups in all
places, and in the face of declining yields of legally sustainable arrests (Weiser, 2008).
What then can explain the durability of a policy whose utility is weakening over time?
Two possibilities come to mind. The first is that these patterns over time reflect a durable
institutionalized preference to maintain these tactics even as their necessity and value is
less apparent, and even as political costs mount to the practice. The practice has persisted
through sharp political and legal criticism (Spitzer, 1999) and civil rights litigation against
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the NYPD that resulted in injunctive relief and oversight by private legal groups (Daniels v
City of New York, Stipulation of Agreement, 2003).
Beyond political costs, the persistence of policing tactics with disparate
neighborhood impacts has salient social costs. Normative considerations – the absence of
tangible returns from the policy and practice in the face of high social costs to citizens that
are unevenly distributed by race and by place – suggest that the policy diminishes the
social good of policing and weakens its welfarist ideology (Durlauf, 2007), while making
the job of the police harder (Skogan and Frydl, 2004; Harris, 2002). The dissipation of the
social good itself has one-off costs – the withdrawal of citizens of cooperation with the
police in the civic project of the co-production of security (Tyler and Fagan, 2008; Fagan
and Meares, 2008), or, in the worst case, defiance of legal and social norms (Fagan and
Meares, 2007; Paternoster et al., 1997; Sherman, 1993). But such external criteria are
beside the point if the preference is internalized; it need only be justified within the internal
logic of the organization. Whether habit or something more, the maintenance of this
policy responds to internalized incentives that remain invisible to outside observers. Its
persistence requires a form of racial blindsight (Taslitz, 2007) to deracialize institutional
recognition and acknowledgement of its consequences.
The second possibility is more mundane, and has two faces. Stops and searches of
citizens are simple productivity measures for the police. Generating accurate and detailed
information about stops conducted by police provides a numerical measure of police
activity and outputs that is easily conveyed to citizens and oversight entities. This is
especially important as crime rates decline and the traditional metrics of police
productivity – arrests, crimes – no longer are sufficiently sensitive to gauge the efforts of a
large and complex organization (Moore, 2002). If policing is a public good, the stop
numbers provide a valuable measure of the services that produce that good.
Stops also generate a cheap form of intelligence. Intelligence was the traditional
utility of the data generated in the course of stops and searches of citizens (Spitzer, 1999).9
For years, the reports generated by stops of citizens sat in file drawers in precincts and
9

For juveniles, the parallel intelligence-gathering mechanism is the issuance of so-called YD cards to minors
who are stopped by the police but not arrested. YD (for Youth Division) cards are not entered into electronic
databases.
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were examined as police searched for suspects when crime patterns emerged. The
information was entered into databases starting in the late 1990s, in part a response to
external investigations in reaction to political conflict following a sequence of violent,
tragic and well publicized deaths of two citizens during encounters with the police
(Spitzer, 1999). This rudimentary neural network of information was automated in the late
1990s, and has evolved into a systematic database that is one of the primary sources of
information on police activity.
These institutionalized preferences, which endure in the face of persistent futility,
serve the bureaucratic interests of the police hierarchy. Normative concerns over racial
impacts take a back seat to the institutional interests that are indifferent to the potential for
externalized costs and racial inequalities that ensue from a sustained policy with declining
returns. Yet everyone has a stake in a safe society, and so security – which is primarily the
province of the police – is a public good (Loader and Walker, 2007). Policing is not a
discretionary service, nor is it non-trivial in the sense that it is cost-free. In New York, the
cost burden of this safety – which largely accrues to White New Yorkers – is shifted to
the 95% of African American citizens who are stopped but innocent of whatever suspected
crime animated the stop. The benefits of policing – safety, calling offenders to account,
conflict resolution, order, information – are social goods that are available to everyone at a
low social cost, or at least at a cost that is equitably distributed. The production of this
social good is not well served by the patterns we observe over the past decade of order
maintenance policing in New York.
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Table 14.1: Stop Activity and Neighborhood Socioeconomic Conditions

Citywide Stop Rates per 1,000 Persons
Total Stops
Blacks
Whites
Hispanics

Neighborhood Characteristics
Neighborhood Stop Activity
Number of Stops
Stops of Blacks
Stops of Whites
Stops of Hispanics
Physical Disorder
Exterior Walls
Exterior Windows
Stairways
Floors
Structural Characteristics
Public Assistance
Foreign Born
Percent Foreign Born
Entropy
Mobility (% living < 5 years)
Vacancy Rate
Households
Total
Black
White
Hispanic

1999

2002/2003

2005/2006

Stops per 1,000
persons

Stops per 1,000
persons

Stops per 1,000
persons

12.5
26.6
3.5
15.1

19.4
37.7
6
19.5

60.2
130.8
17.9
63.9

Mean

SD

Mean

SD

Mean

% Change
(19992005)
381.6
391.7
411.4
323.2

SD

1,813
988
187
584

1,099
864
145
560

2,923
1,412
320
810

1,671
1,369
274
600

9,209
4,863
973
2,688

6,480
5,479
861
2,174

407.8
392.2
420.2
360.5

3.09%
3.36%
5.25%
5.08%

0.03
0.03
0.04
0.04

2.63%
3.45%
5.29%
4.75%

0.02
0.03
0.04
0.04

2.83%
2.36%
4.24%
4.06%

0.02
0.02
0.03
0.03

-8.5
-29.8
-19.3
-20.1

18.24%
46.19%
36.34%
89.02%
40.26%
5.62%

0.13
0.16
0.16
0.24
0.05
0.03

15.17%
43.56%
43.56%
93.64%
35.88%
6.87%

0.1
0.14
0.14
0.25
0.05
0.04

16.41%
49.61%
41.18%
95.48%
36.08%
6.68%

0.11
0.16
0.16
0.22
0.05
0.03

-10
7.4
13.3
7.3
-10.4
18.8

55,236 16,803
12,570 12,603
24,191 21,426
12,881 9,206

5.9
3.5
0.3
10.3

52,153 19,305
12,150 11,930
24,112 23,404
11,682 9,155

54,642 16,552
13,115 13,382
24,359 22,015
12,200 9,063

Sources:
Socioeconomic and Household Data from New York City Housing and Vacancy Surveys, 1999, 2002, 2005
Stop and Frisk Data: New York City Police Department, 2003, 2006; New York State, Office of the Attorney General, 1999
Population Data: U.S. Bureau of the Census, 2000; New York City Department of City Planning, "Bytes of the Big Apple"
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Table 14.4a. Probability of Stops for African American Males,
Ages 18-19, 2006
% Repeat Stops
25%
50%
75%
% Stopped
10%
0.79
0.56
0.33
More Than
25%
0.71
0.48
Once
50%
0.73

Note: Excludes stops that were made in 1st, 14th, 22nd and 18th precincts
Population: 30,999. Stops: 28,539

Table 14.4b. Probability of Stops for African American Males,
Ages 18-24, 2006
% Repeat Stops
25%
50%
75%
% Stopped
10%
0.69
0.49
0.30
More Than
25%
0.64
0.45
Once
50%
0.70

Note: Excludes stops that were made in 1st, 14th, 22nd and 18th precincts
Population: 104,880 Stops: 82,125

Table 14.4c. Probability of Stops for Hispanic Males,
Ages 18-24, 2006
% Repeat Stops
25%
% Stopped
More Than
Once

10%
20%
25%

50%
0.29

Note: Excludes stops that were made in 1st, 14th, 22nd and 18th precincts
Population: 127,128

75%
0.20
0.30
0.35

Stops: 48,968

Table 14.4d. Probability of Stops for Non-Hispanic White Males,
Ages 18-24, 2006
% Repeat Stops
25%
50%
75%
% Stopped
2%
0.12
0.09
0.05
More Than
5%
0.12
0.08
Once
10%
0.13

Note: Excludes stops that were made in 1st, 14th, 22nd and 18th precincts
Population: 107,936 Stops: 15,065
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Appendix A. Specific Police Conduct Permitted under DeBour
1. What is a Stop?
Police stop and frisk procedures have been ruled constitutional under specific conditions
articulated in Terry v. Ohio (1968). Under Terry, Fourth Amendment restrictions on
unreasonable searches and seizures allow a police officer to stop a suspect on the street and
search her without probable cause to arrest if the police officer has a reasonable suspicion that
the person has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime. For their own
protection, police may perform a quick surface search of the person’s outer clothing for weapons
if they have reasonable suspicion that the person stopped is armed. This reasonable suspicion
must be based on “specific and articulable facts” and not merely upon an officer's hunch.
2. Permissible Behaviors
New York law regulates police conduct more thoroughly than does Terry. New York law
articulates a four-step analysis articulated in People v. DeBour (1976) and People v. Holmes
(1996). Stops are governed by N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 140.50(1) (2007):
In addition to the authority provided by this article for making an arrest without a
warrant, a police officer may stop a person in a public place located within the
geographical area of such officer’s employment when he reasonably suspects that
such person is committing, has committed or is about to commit either (a) a felony
or (b) a misdemeanor defined in the penal law, and may demand of him his name,
address and an explanation of his conduct.
“Stops” and “frisks” are considered separately under New York statutes. A police officer
may stop a suspect but not to frisk the suspect given the circumstances. Frisks and searches are
governed by N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 140.50(3), which requires a legitimate “stop” as a predicate
to any frisk.10 In many cases, reasonable suspicion that a person is engaging in violent or
dangerous crime (such as murder, burglary, assault, etc.) will justify both a stop and a frisk.
Table X shows the circumstances that are necessary for a stop to escalate to a frisk and
10

“When upon stopping a person under circumstances prescribed in subdivisions one and two a police officer or
court officer, as the case may be, reasonably suspects that he is in danger of physical injury, he may search such
person for a deadly weapon or any instrument, article or substance readily capable of causing serious physical injury
and of a sort not ordinarily carried in public places by law-abiding persons. If he finds such a weapon or instrument,
or any other property possession of which he reasonably believes may constitute the commission of a crime, he may
take it and keep it until the completion of the questioning, at which time he shall either return it, if lawfully
possessed, or arrest such person.” N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 140.50(3)

Street Stops and Broken Windows Revisited
Page 54

ultimately to an arrest. Appendix A shows the specific police actions that are permitted at each
level of a Terry/DeBour stop in New York.
Table A1. DeBour’s Four Levels of Street Encountersa
Predicate

Permissible Response

Level 1

Objective Credible Reason Approach to Request Information

Level 2

Founded Suspicion - Common Law Right of Inquiry

Level 3

Reasonable Suspicion Stop and (if fear of weapon) Frisk

Level 4

Probable Cause Arrest and Full Search Incident

a. People v. DeBour, 40 N.Y. 2d 210 (1976)
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Table A2. Permissible Actions by Police Officers during Stops
Predicate

Permissible Response

Level 1

P.O. can ask non-threatening questions regarding name, address,
destination and, if person carrying something unusual, police officer can
ask about that. Encounter should be brief and non-threatening. There
should be an absence of harassment and intimidation.
PO can:
• say “STOP” (If not “forceful”)
• approach a stopped car
• touch holster.

PO cannot:
• request permission to search
• cause people to reasonably believe they’re suspected of crime, no matter
how calm and polite the tone of the questions

Level 2

PO can ask pointed questions that would reasonably lead one to believe
that he/she is suspected of a crime. Questions can be more extended and
accusatory. Focus on possible criminality.
PO can:
• request permission to search

PO cannot:
• pursue
• forcibly detain

Level 3

PO can:
•
•
•
•
•
•

Level 4

forcibly detain
frisk for weapons if in fear
pull car out of traffic flow
order defendant to lie on the ground
handcuff (for good reason)
pursue

PO can arrest and search suspect

